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Abstract. This paper uses extensive data on production out-
comes for processing tomato growers in California to examine the
e±cacy of explicit incentives observed in grower-processor con-
tracts. Our data include all deliveries of tomatoes to some 51
processors over a period of 7 years in which at least 65 unique
types of contracts are employed. Results indicate that incentives
account for a signi¯cant proportion of observed variation in produc-
tion outcomes, and that complementarities across di®erent sorts
of \incentive instruments" play a prominent role in contract de-
sign. Although explicit incentives explain a substantial portion
of the variation in production outcomes relative to that which
could be explained by incentives (as captured by processor/year
¯xed e®ects), there remains considerable variation which might be
accounted for by unobserved or implicit incentives. Finally, we
control for a quite exhaustive set of factors other than incentive
provisions that might conceivably a®ect expected production out-
comes, yet are still left with a substantial amount of unexplained
variation.
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1. Introduction
The production of processing tomatoes in California is generally gov-
erned by a contract between one of a number of processors and indi-
vidual growers. Tomato quality is a key concern for processors, and
is re°ected contractually in explicit quality-related performance incen-
tives. We have obtained data on the measured quality of most of the
\loads" of processing tomatoes produced in California over a seven year
period, and observe the contractual provisions relating grower compen-
sation to measured quality for each of these loads. In this paper, we
attempt to measure the e±cacy of these contractual provisions by esti-
mating their e®ect (both alone and in combination) on the conditional
means of measured quality characteristics.
While a number of recent studies have estimated the e®ect of per-
formance incentives on production outcomes, these studies are mostly
limited to comparisons within a single ¯rm between performance under
°at wage schedules and performance under some kind of \piece-rate"
regime (e.g., Lazear (2000), Paarsch and Shearer (2000)).
1 Ichniowski
et al. (1997) use data from a cross section of ¯rms (during a single
year), but consider the e®ect of variation in \human resource manage-
ment practices," rather than in explicit performance incentives.
The data for our study include include all loads of tomatoes delivered
to some 51 processors over a 7 year period in which at least 65 unique
types of contracts are employed, and thus represent an opportunity
to test for a broad range of incentive e®ects. After taking account of
heterogeneity across growers, tomato varieties, growing regions, years,
and delivery months, we estimate an upper bound on the variance in
quality outcomes that could be due to the provision of incentives; we
then see how much variance is actually accounted for by variation in
premia explicitly o®ered in tomato contracts.
Brie°y, results indicate that incentives account for a signi¯cant pro-
portion of observed variation in production outcomes, and that com-
plementarities across di®erent sorts of \incentive instruments" play a
prominent role in contract design.
2 Although explicit incentives ob-
served in actual contracts explain a substantial portion of the variation
in production outcomes relative to that which could be explained by
1Rather than summarize this literature, we refer the interested reader to Pren-
dergast (1999) who provides a comprehensive overview.
2Other authors have examined the response of tomato quality to incentive provi-
sions in contracts using similar data [Alexander et al. (1999); Wu (2001)], but have
generally found that incentives provided in these contracts are of minor importance,
or have no signi¯cant e®ect on outcomes. Our results suggest that neither of these
earlier e®orts adequately controlled for observable sources of heterogeneity.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 2
incentives (as captured by processor/year ¯xed e®ects), there remains
considerable variation which might be accounted for by unobserved
or implicit incentives. Finally, we control for a quite exhaustive set
of factors other than incentive provisions that might conceivably af-
fect expected production outcomes, yet are still left with a substantial
amount of unexplained variation.
2. California Processing Tomato Markets
2.1. Growers and Processors. California is the largest producer of
processing tomatoes in the United States, typically accounting for over
95 per cent of total annual production (over 10 million tons in 1998).
The top portion of Table 1 summarizes the number of growers, proces-
sors, and total delivered \loads" in each of the years between 1993{99.
The unit of osbservation for our data is a load of tomatoes (slightly less
than an acre's production in a typical year), so the number of loads in
each year also represents total annual observations.
To identify the in°uence of incentive provisions on grower behav-
ior (and on expected quality outcomes), we need to observe individual
growers delivering tomatoes under more than one type of incentive con-
tract. Provided there is adequate variation in contractual incentives
across processors (which we document below), observation of quality
outcomes associated with loads delivered by the same grower to di®er-
ent processors provides such an opportunity. The second part of Table
1 presents a simple count of instances where growers deliver loads (of
the same variety) to multiple processors. These instances will provide
the principal source of identi¯cation for our estimation of \incentive
e®ects" in Section 5.
Table 1. Summary Statistics: Growers and Processors
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
total number
Growers 237 276 311 325 287 253 285
Processors 18 22 27 27 24 22 23
Loads 133602 206155 264661 258628 239085 193717 272945
Growers delivering to
1 processor 145 144 142 139 129 124 145
2 processors 57 56 70 78 72 66 73
3 processors 24 47 52 46 53 36 42
4 processors 5 20 25 34 17 16 11
¸5 processors 6 9 22 28 16 11 14EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 3



















































Figure 1. Lorenz curves illustrating the distribution of
total tomato production (by weight) across growers and
processors during the period 1993{99.
Tomato growers and processors vary widely in the size of their op-
erations. Figure 1 displays Lorenz curves for growers and processors
and their respective contributions to total industry production over the
period 1993{99. There were 533 total growers in these years, and fewer
than 10 per cent of these accounted for 41 per cent of total production.
Similarly, there were 51 processors in California who bought tomatoes
in one or more of the years 1993{99, and half of these accounted for
less than 2 per cent of total production.
Among the processors there's considerable variation in how toma-
toes are obtained. Two processors are cooperative ventures owned by
tomato growers, which obtain most of their tomatoes from member
growers. Some small proportion of tomatoes obtained by processors
is purchased on spot markets.3 However, the vast bulk of process-
ing tomatoes are grown by farmers under a contract negotiated before
planting. As we describe in greater detail below, the general structure
of these contracts is common across processors, but with considerable
variation within this structure.
3Alexander et al. (1999) use this fact to examine quality di®erences between
tomatoes obtained under a contract and on spot markets, but only by a single
processor in a single year using a single contract; accordingly, they are unable to
draw any inference regarding the e®ect of speci¯c kinds of contractual provisions.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 4
2.2. Institutional Arrangements. Two important institutions me-
diate exchange between growers and processors in California. The Cal-
ifornia Tomato Growers Association (CTGA) is a bargaining entity
that negotiates contract terms with processors on behalf of member
growers. Membership in this organization °uctuates from year to year,
but generally accounts for between 65% and 70% of growers. The Pro-
cessing Tomato Advisory Board (PTAB) performs third-party quality
measurement and is jointly funded by processors and growers. All
loads delivered by growers (CTGA members and non-members) must
be inspected at a certi¯ed PTAB grading station; the standard qual-
ity attributes measured for each load include weight, sub-skin color or
\comminution" (Comm), the proportion of unripe or green tomatoes
(Green) and a measure of sugar content, \soluble solids" (Solids). Also
measured are various sorts of damage. These include: Mold, Worms,
and extraneous material or \material other than tomatoes" (MOT4).
Finally, tomatoes that are soft and potentially di±cult to processes are
classi¯ed as \limited use" (LU5).
The CTGA and PTAB each play a key role in determining the con-
tractual arrangements that govern the relationship between growers
and processors. In particular, quality measures by PTAB help deter-
mine the payments made to farmers via processor contracts that con-
dition payment on each measure (or possibly on some subset of mea-
sures). The CTGA plays a complementary role, by annually negotiat-
ing a \master" contract with many of the processors (161 of 262 total
contracts over the period 1993{99) that speci¯es the way in which qual-
ity measures a®ect grower compensation, the conditions under which
processors may \reject" loads of tomatoes, and which provides explicit
mechanisms for resolving disputes between growers and processors.
Although the CTGA is involved in negotiating over the ways in which
quality measurements a®ect grower compensation, individual proces-
sors negotiate with individual farmers over how many tomatoes the
grower is to provide. In years past, many processors committed to pur-
chase all of the tomatoes grown on some ¯xed number of acres. This
arrangement still appears as an option in some years for one of the
processors whose contracts we observe, but otherwise processors now
4Material other than tomatoes includes \dirt and extraneous material (de-
tached stems, vines, rocks or debris)." (Processing Tomato Advisory Board,
http://www.ptab.org/order.htm)
5A limited use tomato is \i.) whole but has a soft, watery condition under the
skin so that more than 25% of the skin is separated from the underlying °esh; ii.)
is more than 50% soft and mushy or iii.) is broken completely through the wall so
the seed cavity is visible," ibid.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 5
commit to accept a ¯xed number of \loads" of tomatoes, though if the
grower should happen to produce somewhat more than this quantity
the processor may choose to accept these additional loads (otherwise
the extra loads will probably be sold on the spot markets mentioned
above). Though contracts are negotiated annually, there may be im-
plicit dynamic incentives, as farmers who have performed well in past
years are rewarded with increases in the number of loads the proces-
sor commits to accept in subsequent years. For all CTGA negotiated
contracts, the growers' compensation is based on the number of tons
delivered, and is adjusted according to the outcome of the various qual-
ity attributes measured by the PTAB.
2.3. Observed Contracts. For many of the contracts negotiated by
the CTGA, the way quality measurements in°uence compensation for
a given load has a standard form. For future reference it will be useful
to characterize this form algebraically. Let q = (q1;:::;qm) represent a
vector of quality measures (which may include measures of both \qual-
ity" and \damage"). People in the processing tomato industry draw
a distinction between quality characteristics for which growers are re-
warded premia (in dollars per ton) in contracts versus those for which
growers are punished by use of deducts (as a percentage of delivered
quantity), though some measures are hybrid in the sense that they
receive both premia and deducts. Accordingly, letting ¯i(q) represent
premia associated with the realization of measure i, and ±i(q) represent
the percentage deduct, per-ton compensation is given by







where p is a \base price." The functions ±i and ¯i are typically piecewise-
linear, and depend on the entire vector of outcomes q because the pre-
mium and deduct levels for any given measure may be conditionally
dependent on the outcome of one or more other measures.6 Even this
standard form permits a great deal of variation, and is typically highly
non-linear. Moreover, a considerable proportion of CTGA-negotiated
6While this paper does not address the e±ciency of contracts, the form taken
by compensation is very suggestive. Possible avenues for examining the contract
design problem might include a model of multitasking (HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom
(1991); La®ont and Martimort (2002)), in which compensation may take an ad-
ditively separable form (where only \local incentive compatibility" constraints are
binding), or a (possibly simpler) model in which separability across some quality
measures follows from the independence of measures conditional on agents' actions,
logarithmic utility, and the validity of the \¯rst order approach" (Hueth and Ligon
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contracts augment this standard form by adding conditions which in-
duce various forms of dependence either across loads delivered by a
given grower, or across growers (this latter is a form of relative perfor-
mance evaluation).
In practice, the compensation function in equation (1) is imple-
mented with a tabular set of rules that specify intervals for each mea-
sure and associated unit premium and deduct levels. We brie°y de-
scribe one example somewhat arbitrarily chosen from a single processor
in 1998. The contract in Table 2 o®ers a set of \standard deducts" (de-
ductions on these measures are universally provided, though the speci¯c
deduct levels may vary from one processor to another), and premiums
for MOT, Green, LU, and Comm. Deduct incentives for MOT are sig-
ni¯cantly higher powered than those for other damage measures; each
percent increase in MOT results in an additional three percent deduc-
tion from gross weight. Deduct incentives for LU are piecewise, and
strictly concave. The LU premium ranges from 0.50 dollars per ton
for LU greater or equal to 5 per cent to 5 dollars for LU less than or
equal to 0.5 per cent. The maximum LU premium is over 10 percent of
the base price (48.5 dollars per ton), and thus represents a substantial
economic incentive for producing low LU.7 Premiums for Comm are
conditionally dependent on LU being no more than 4.5 percent, and
are highest for intermediate values.
Without knowing something about the conditional (joint) distribu-
tion of the quality measures q, it is somewhat di±cult to interpret the
incentives in Table 2. A slightly more informative representation of
this example contract is depicted in Figure 2. Here, we trace out mar-
ginal incentives by individually varying the seven quality measures as
standard deviations from their respective mean values (over all loads
delivered in 1998), and by ordering them so that higher values of each
measure are more desirable (with the exception of Comm, which is
preferred at intermediate levels for this contract); other characteris-
tics necessary to determine compensation are held ¯xed at either their
means for all loads in 1998, or at their mode where the mean isn't
sensible (e.g., for county of origin or date of delivery).
The slope of each line at a given point provides a measure of the
local `power' of incentives. Note that incentives for Mold appear much
more highly powered than those for Worms, even though both measures
share the same deduct structure in Table 2. This is so because the
7The average net weight of a \load" of tomatoes is roughly 25 tons and represents
slightly less than an acre's production. Thus, for this particular contract, the
maximum potential LU premium per load is roughly 125 dollars.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 7
Table 2. Processing tomato contract with an LU,
MOT, Green, and Comm \incentive program"; Base
Price=$48.50 per net ton.





LU (%) [0,5] [5.5,8] [8.5,14] [14,100]
deduct 0 1£(LU-5) 1:5£(LU-5) 2£(LU-5)





LU (%) [0,0.5] 1 1.5 2 2.5 [3.0,4.5] [5.0,100]
premium 5.0 4.0 3.75 2.75 1.25 0 -0.5
Comm [0,19] 20 [21,25] 26 ¸ 27
premium 0 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.0
(if LU· 4:5)
(unconditional) standard deviation for Worms across all years is much
smaller than that of Mold. Similarly, the MOT deduct incentives in
Table 2, which penalize each per cent increase in MOT at three times
the penalty for increases in Green, generate nearly identical marginal
deduct incentives to those of Green.
So far, we have talked at some length about the general structure
of processing tomato contracts, and about the speci¯c structure of one
example contract. As noted in the previous section, identi¯cation of
\incentive e®ects" (the in°uence of incentives on behavior) requires
adequate variation in contract structures across processors and years.
To give some indication of the extent and nature of variation in the
structure of these contracts, Table ?? presents the unique set of com-
minution (as noted earlier, this is a measure of sub-skin color) pre-
mia observed across all processors and years. There are a total of 12
unique premium structures for this particular measure across 165 pro-
cessor/years. A considerable majority of processor/years (144 out of
165) do not o®er premium for comminution. Average comminution
across all loads and years was roughly 24 with a standard deviation
of 2.78. Thus, it's apparent from the incentive structures in Table ??EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 8



































Figure 2. Compensation for the contract in Table 2
evaluated at the mean of each quality measure (and mode
grower, variety, location, and date of harvest). Marginal
incentives for each measure are evaluated at standard de-
viations from the relevant mean, holding other measures
constant.
that most processors are interested in obtaining low levels of comminu-
tion (although low comminution is generally preferred, the contract in
Table 2 indicates that at least one processor prefers intermediate val-
ues for Comm). A signi¯cant number of processor/years (15) o®ered
comminution incentives with some form of conditional dependence (in-
cluding the processor associated with the contract in Table 2), and of
these, 6 correspond to unique processors.
Incentive structures similarly vary across each of the other quality
measures, though to a more or lesser degree. Incentives for LU exhibit
the greatest amount of variation with 51 unique structures, followed by
MOT (37 unique structures), Solids (14 unique structures), and Green
(7 unique structures); there were 2 unique structures observed for Mold
and Worms.8
8For the set of measures on which deducts are assessed (LU, MOT, Green, Mold,
Worms), a \unique structure" refers to uniqueness across the combination of premia
and deduct provisions. For example, there was only a single instance of a Green
premium, but 7 distinct deduct structures for this measure.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 9
One important line of research pursued by Wu (2001) seeks to ex-
plain the reasons for the variation observed in contracts|since proces-
sors appear to be solving similar problems with their contracts, why is
it that they don't all adopt the same contract? Wu's answer is that
since di®erent processors use tomatoes for di®erent purposes, they also
value tomato attributes di®erently. For example, processors who make
whole tomato products may ¯nd it more worthwhile to o®er a larger
premium for sub-skin color (comminution) than would paste producers.
Another possibility might relate di®erences in the contractual terms
o®ered by various processors to di®erences in their contracting envi-
ronments; since it's costly and di±cult to transport ripe tomatoes over
great distances, most processors obtain the tomatoes they use from
nearby growers, and a well-designed contract ought to take advantage
of di®erences in climate, soil, or the distribution of characteristics of
nearby growers. For present purposes we use observed variation in
contract terms to evaluate the e®ect of contract incentives on expected
quality outcomes, and do not explore the reasons for observed varia-
tion in contracts. This has the e®ect of making our results less useful
to tomato processors than they might otherwise be|in particular, the
results of this paper cannot, on their own, be used to describe what the
e±cient contract for a given processor would be. We merely describe
the e®ects of variation in contracts on quality outcomes and on the
compensation given growers, without making any attempt to describe
the varied costs and bene¯ts which would accrue to a processor who
adopted a particular contract.
3. Model
In this section, we specify a model that relates equilibrium grower
actions (which vary across processors and growers), observed sources
of heterogeneity, and unobserved stochastic sources of heterogeneity, to
the distribution of quality across di®erent processors.
We begin with a brief description of the environment. Our basic unit
of observation is a \load" of tomatoes; we index these n loads by j. Any
given load j has a variety of measured characteristics. In particular,
the jth load comprises tomatoes of variety vj 2 f1;:::;V g, having
been grown by a grower ij 2 f1;:::;Ig and delivered to processor
`j 2 f1;:::;Lg. In addition to these basic characteristics, the jth
load will have been harvested in county dj 2 f1;:::;Dg in month
mj 2 fJune;July;August;Octoberg of year tj 2 f1;:::;Tg. Finally
(and critically for our purposes), for each load j we observe a K-vector
of quality characteristics qj.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 10
Growers possess a number of important characteristics. Some of
these are assumed to be invariant over time (e.g., industriousness, soil
characteristics of the farm operated by grower i, preferences); we denote
the invariant grower characteristics of grower i by bi. Other grower
characteristics may vary across time, across load characteristics, or
depend on choices made by the grower (e.g., management decisions
such as how much fertilizer to use); accordingly, we assume that the
grower takes a single set of actions a`
it which in°uences the distribution
of quality characteristics for all the tomatoes the grower delivers to
processor `.
Not only is the distribution of the vector of quality characteristics
assumed to depend on the actions and characteristics of the grower, but
also on the time of harvest, location of the ¯eld in which the tomatoes
are grown, and the variety of tomato comprising the load. Accordingly,
we let G(qja
`j
ij;bij;dj;mj;tj;vj) denote the conditional joint distribution
of quality characteristics for load j. These conditioning variables are






ij;bij) + ¸(dj;mj;tj) + ¹(vj;tj);
where Á is an arbitrary vector-valued function of the characteristics
and actions of the grower, ¸ is an arbitrary vector-valued function of
the date (month and year) and location where the tomatoes are grown,
and ¹ is an arbitrary vector-valued function of the tomato variety and
year.
Of course, in any year a typical grower will produce more than a
single load of tomatoes, and so we'll ¯nd it convenient to develop a
notation which allows us to characterize the joint distribution of qual-
ity characteristics for all the loads of tomatoes produced by i in a
single year t. We take ~ ait to be a list of the sets of actions for all
the processors i delivers to in year t. Similarly, some producers grow
tomatoes in more than one county; let ~ dit denote the list of coun-
ties to which the grower's loads are delivered. Let ~ mit and ~ vit de-
note the list of harvest months and varieties grown by grower i in
year t.9 These lists of actions, locations, harvest months and vari-
eties all in°uence the joint distribution of the quality characteristics
of all the loads of tomatoes grown by i in t; call the list of quality
9In general, the lengths of these lists will depend on the number of loads of
tomatoes produced by the grower, which perhaps ought to be regarded as a random
variable. However, in keeping with our focus on quality outcomes rather than
quantities, we'll ¯nd it convenient to regard the number of loads produced as a
number determined by the grower at the beginning of the season. It's worth noting
once again that the number of loads to be delivered is negotiated prior to planting.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 11
characteristics for all these loads ~ qit, and denote the joint distribution





Note that this speci¯cation of Git implies that quality characteristics
are conditionally independent across loads.
So far, our description of the environment has been essentially a de-
scription of technology, of the mapping from inputs and characteristics
into outcomes (quality measures). However, among the most impor-
tant of the inputs to tomato quality production are the actions and
decisions taken by the grower, who in turn chooses these based on the
incentives and contraints he faces. In particular, we assume that the
grower values the revenue he derives from selling his tomatoes. This
revenue, in turn, will generally depend on the terms of the contracts
o®ered growers by processors; among other things, these contracts con-
dition payment for a given load on realized quality characteristics q.
Accordingly, we denote the compensation scheme o®ered by processor
` in year t for delivery of a load of tomatoes having characteristics
q as ¼`
t(q). Set against these grower revenues are the costs incurred
by a grower having characteristics b who takes actions ~ a a®ecting the
distribution of quality characteristics, which we write as c(~ a;b).
Grower i is assumed to have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences,
with utility function Ui : R ! R. Accordingly, a grower i who delivers
loads of tomatoes in year t chooses his actions by solving
(3)











j) ¡ c(~ a;bi)
1
AdGit(~ qj~ ait;bi; ~ dit; ~ mit; ~ vit):
Thus, (3) yields a decision rule which maps contractual provisions and
¯xed grower characteristics into a set of management decisions taken
by each grower. These management decisions in turn in°uence the
distribution of quality and compensation outcomes.
In general, the growers' decision rule (3) makes even management
decisions which a®ect only loads delivered to a given processor depend
on the compensation rule o®ered by other processors. This in turn
implies that in designing a contract, any given processor ` ought to
condition compensation on the quality characteristics of tomatoes de-
livered to other processors. In practice, we don't observe this kind of
dependence. Accordingly, let us assume that growers' utility functions
are exponential, with Ui(x) = ¾
¡1
i e¡¾ix, where ¾i can be interpreted to
be grower i's coe±cient of absolute risk aversion (Pratt, 1964). Let us
further assume that the growers' cost function takes a linear form in ~ a,




it denotes the number of loadsEFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 12
delivered by grower i to processor ` in year t (recall that this quantity
is negotiated prior to planting). These assumptions su±ce to deliver a
sort of conditional independence in the actions taken across processors,
so that the grower's problem of choosing how to cultivate tomatoes to






















it denote the average compensation grower i receives from pro-
cessor ` for loads delivered in year t. Note that the grower cares only
about the total compensation he receives. If the number of loads he
delivers is small, then he may bear a considerable amount of risk re-
lated to variation in realized quality, but as the number of loads he
delivers grows large, a law of large numbers implies that the amount of
risk faced by the grower will go to zero, and grower i's vector of actions
a`
it will converge to the value ^ a`










This rule determining actions amounts to equating the marginal cost
of each action to the marginal bene¯t, given the compensation rule ¼`
it
and the in°uence of actions on expected quality outcomes Á(a;b).
4. Data
In addition the contracts described in Section 2.3, we have collected
the measured load characteristics of each of the over 1.5 million loads
of processing tomatoes delivered under these contracts, accounting for
roughly 65 per cent of all the processing tomatoes produced in Califor-
nia during the 1993{99 period. Each load of tomatoes was graded at
one of 45 grading stations in the state, and then delivered to one of 51
processors. Table 3 summarizes various statistics of these loads (and
associated compensation) conditional only on year for three selected
years.
On average damaged tomatoes (those which have problems with
Mold, MOT, Worms, Green, or LU) comprise roughly 5 per cent of
each load of tomatoes. Of this 5 per cent, half of the damaged toma-
toes are of limited use. Mold, Green, MOT are the next most important
sources of damage, in decreasing order of importance; signi¯cant dam-
age from Worms is quite unusual. However, both within and across
years, damage from Worms exhibits the greatest variability (as mea-
sured by the coe±cient of variation), followed by MOT, Mold, Green,EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 13
and LU. These measures of damage are all commensurate, as each is
measured in terms of the damaged proportion of a random sample of
tomatoes. The remaining measures, Comm and Solids are not com-
mensurate with these; however, the coe±cient of variation of these
two quality measures is much smaller than is variation in the damage
measures.
Table 3. Summary Statistics: Quality and Compensa-
tion Outcomes
1994 1996 1998
Measure mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Comm 23.27 2.76 25.13 2.79 24.48 2.84
LU 2.58 2.45 2.46 2.51 2.03 2.03
MOT 0.33 0.45 0.30 0.43 0.33 0.51
Solids 5.16 0.55 5.19 0.52 5.28 0.49
Green 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.70 1.00 1.41
Mold 1.34 1.59 1.16 1.23 1.81 2.17
Worms 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.12
Premium ($/ton)
Comm 1.07 1.01 1.29 1.13 1.43 1.28
LU 0.91 0.69 1.07 0.91 1.80 1.31
MOT 0.50 0.68 0.55 0.65 0.63 0.81
Solids 0.74 1.18 1.01 1.69 1.35 1.14
Deduction ($/ton)
Green 0.21 0.32 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.52
LU 0.28 0.92 0.29 0.98 0.16 0.67
MOT 0.20 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.72
Mold 0.33 0.39 0.30 0.32 0.47 0.56
Worms 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03
Mean premia range between 50 cents for MOT in 1994 and 1.8 dollars
for LU in 1998. There is considerably more spread among the various
premium levels than among the dollar value of deducts. With the
exception of Worms (which rarely results in a deduction) each of the
deduct measures generally results in a reduction of 20 to 30 cents in
per ton compensation. Also, mean premia increased for each measure
across the reported years, while there is no apparent trend in the deduct
levels.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 14
Table 4 summarizes variation in quality that can be explained by ob-
served sources of heterogeneity other than di®erences in contract struc-
tures. Processing tomatoes are harvested over a roughly ¯ve month pe-
riod, beginning in June and ending in October, starting in the southern
part of the state and moving north over the course of the summer. Sur-
prisingly little of the variation observed in quality characteristics is due
to location and the time of harvest. The second row of Table 4 reports
(for each of seven quality measures) the proportion of variance in qual-
ity accounted for by conditioning on the district, month, and year of
harvest. There are 10 districts, ¯ve months, and seven years of data,
so we are in e®ect reporting the R2 statistic from a simple OLS re-
gression of each of these quality characteristics on a set of 350 dummy
variables.10 Time and location explains eight per cent of the variation
in measured mold, four per cent of the variation in color (measured by
Comm), and somewhat less than three per cent of the variation in LU
tomatoes. MOT seems to have very little dependence on location and
time; roughly two per cent of the variation in the remaining measures
is accounted for by these time and location dummies.
Solids Worms Comm. Green Mold MOT LU
Grower-Year 0.2441 0.0430 0.3014 0.2420 0.2050 0.1184 0.2127
County-Month-
Year
0.1228 0.0324 0.2339 0.1360 0.2411 0.0364 0.1278
Variety-Year 0.1980 0.0133 0.2137 0.0786 0.1287 0.0225 0.1511
Processor-Year 0.0640 0.0236 0.1508 0.1079 0.0628 0.0224 0.0733
R2 0.3746 0.0655 0.4034 0.2909 0.3306 0.1326 0.3242
Table 4. ANOVA Results for Quality Measures. Each
of the ¯rst four rows reports the proportion of variance
in quality measures accounted for by the set of dummy
variables described in the ¯rst column. The ¯nal row
reports the R2 statistic for a least squares regression of
each quality measure on all the dummy variables.
Much more variance in quality characteristics is accounted for by
information on grower-year. Though we have data on 533 growers over
seven years, not all of these growers produced tomatoes in every year,
so that we have a total of 2026 distinct grower-years. These grower
10The computation of variance explained is carried out by regressing each quality
measure on each set of indicator variables alone, and thus represents an upper bound
on the total variation that is uniquely explained by each respective set of indicators.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 15
characteristics account for as much as 30 per cent of the variation
observed in Comm, and about 24 per cent of the variation in Solids
and Green. Roughly 21 per cent of the variation in Mold and LU are
accounted for by these latent variables, while twelve per cent of MOT
and 4 per cent of Worms seems to be explained by this grower-year
variation.
A considerable but somewhat smaller amount of variation is ac-
counted for by the variety of tomato comprising a load, along with
the year in which those tomatoes are grown. There are 394 di®erent
tomato varieties which appear in our data over seven years, yielding
1198 variety-year dummies which collectively account for twenty-two
per cent of variation in Comm, twenty per cent of Solids, ¯fteen per
cent of LU, and thirteen per cent of Mold; variation in Worms, Green
and Mold varies much less with variety-year, with the latter accounting
for one, eight, and two per cent of variation respectively.
Finally, processor and year account for between two and ¯fteen per-
cent of the variation in observed quality outcomes. In the next section,
we argue that the variation in quality outcomes explained by this set
of indicator variables represents an upper bound on the amount of
variation than can be explained by incentive provisions in contracts.
5. Empirics
Our aim in this paper is to estimate the e®ects that speci¯c incentive
provisions have on the quality characteristics of processing tomatoes.
We have extensive data on these quality characteristics, and know from
the previous section that the distribution of these characteristics de-
pends on aspects of the environment (weather, soil, tomato variety) as
well as on actions taken by the grower.
If we had data on the actions taken by growers, we might ¯nd it
tempting to regard (2) as the basis of an estimating equation. How-
ever, simply estimating the functions Á and ¸ in this equation in iso-
lation would not be a good strategy, as the whole point of our present
exercise has to do with the endogeneity of actions; obtaining consistent
estimates would require either the simultaneous estimation of (2) and
(3), or the use of instrumental variable techniques.
As we do not in fact observe data related to the actions taken by
growers, we are preserved from temptation. In order to focus on the
e®ect of incentives on quality outcomes, we sweep out any (linear)
in°uence of county, month and year or variety and year by de¯ning a
pair of operators
M¸z = z ¡ Proj(zjd;m;t)EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 16
and
M¹z = z ¡ Proj(zjv;t):
Thus, for example, M¸qj is equal to the part of quality outcomes qj
which can't be predicted via a linear regression of quality outcomes on
a set of county-month-year dummy variables (we have seven years of
data; there are 59 counties and six months in which processing toma-
toes are sometimes harvested, and so a total of 420 dummy variables).
Similarly, we employ a set of 1198 variety-year dummies (there are 394
di®erent varieties delivered in our data, but most varieties aren't deliv-





ij;tj;bij) + ¸(dj;mj;tj) + ¹(vj;tj) + uj;
where uj is a disturbance term; applying each of these operators and



































it;bi) is still problematic, of course; we don't
know the function Á, we don't observe its arguments, and we expect
that the actions a`
it taken by grower i and the types of growers who
contract with processor ` are both endogenous. However, we have
a model of grower behavior which tells us that grower actions will
be a function of both contractual characteristics and grower type bi.
Accordingly, let fi(¼`
it) = M¸M¹Á(a(¼`
it;bi);bi) denote the expected
quality characteristics grown by i engendered by the contract ¼`
it. As
described earlier, this contract can be decomposed into terms involving
just the base price paid per ton, terms speci¯c to particular quality
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Substituting this into one of the unknown functions fi and twice ap-


























where ¹ pit is the average base price o®ered by the processors delivered
to by grower i in year t, and where similarly ¹ »it is the average level
of `extra' incentives o®ered by these same processors. Finallly, ³`
it is a
vector of Taylor residuals, which will capture any non-linearities in the
response of expected quality outcomes to changes in the base price p`
it,
quality-measure speci¯c incentives fk¼`
itg, or in the `extra' incentives
»`
it.
Using (7) to substitute into the expression relating grower actions
to expected quality outcomes yields the following expression for the
































































it ¡ ¹ pit) 1¼`
it ::: K¼`
it »`
it]. This in turn suggests the
reduced form matrix estimating equation
(8) q
`







Here the ®it is a set of ¯xed e®ects, which capture variation in fi(¹ pit)
(which is constant across the processors delivered to by grower i by
construction), and ¶K is a column vector of K ones. Remaining varia-
tion in q`
it must be due to di®erences in processors, not di®erences in
growers or years. In particular, note that if grower i delivers to only a
single processor ` in year t, then the right-hand-side variables of inter-
est in (8) will all take the value zero. If, on the other hand, grower i
delivers tomatoes to multiple processors, then these variables will re-
°ect deviations in the contract terms o®ered by processor ` from the
mean of the contractual terms o®ered by all the processors to which i
delivers in a given year.
Since the contractual terms found in (8) are all predetermined, if in
fact we observed every grower delivering to every processor in every
year, we could estimate (8) via least squares. However, no grower
delivers to every processor; some matching process between processors
and growers determines the number of loads delivered by each grower to
each processor in every year. As a consequence, using least squares to
estimate (8) directly would provide consistent estimates of the expectedEFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 18
e®ect of the provisions on mean quality outcomes conditional on the
assignment of growers to processors, but we're chie°y interested in the
unconditional e®ect of incentives on outcomes.
Accordingly, we formalize the selection problem by using observables
to predict the number of loads delivered from each grower to every
processor in each year. Per the notation developed above, the number
of loads actually delivered by grower i to processor ` in year t is denoted
by y`
it. This quantity must be non-negative, but in the absence of this
constraint we imagine that the quantity of tomatoes delivered by i to











Here the vector x`
it is a vector of contract characteristics, as above,
while z`
it is a set of observed processor-grower characteristics which is
assumed to be exogenous, such as the distance from the growers' ¯elds
to the processing plant (processing tomates are harvested when ripe,
and delivery must be quick). We assume that the latent variable ~ y`it
is observed only when non-negative, with
y
`
it = max(0; ~ y
`
it):
We follow Wooldridge (1995) in assuming that v`
it is independent of
(x`
it;z`
it), and is distributed N(0;¾t). Note that although we assume
normality, we permit arbitrary temporal dependence and heteroskedas-
ticity (e.g., we expect that there may be unexplained serial correlation
in the number of loads delivered by i to `). We must also place some
structure on the relationship between v`
it and ²`
it|we assume a linear
structure governs the conditional mean dependence of these variables,
or that there exists a set of mean zero random vectors f®`


















We characterize the complicated set of observed contractual provi-
sions in two ways. In Table 5, we present results from regressing ¢Á`
it
on the base price p o®ered by the processor, on a set of dummy variables
indicating the presence of premia or deductions for each quality char-
acteristic, and on the total volume of tomatoes annually received by
each processor (a measure of processor size). All processors o®er some
form of deduct on MOT, LU, worms, green, and mold, and no proces-
sor deducts for low soluble solids or high comminution. In contrast,
there is substantial variation in the set of measures that are awarded
premia. Because we expect signi¯cant interaction between the variousEFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 19
kinds of quality incentives, we created a further set of indicators for
each unique set of quality premium awarded. The base contract that
is omitted from our regression o®ers no type of quality premium. The
next contract type, labeled \Solids" in Table 5, o®ers only soluble solids
incentives, the contract type labeled \Solids, MOT" o®ers incentives
on soluble solids and MOT, and so on. Thus, the coe±cients for each
indicator measure the e®ect of the respective contract type, relative to
the base contract with no quality premiums.
Interpreting results from Table 5, we ¯rst note that total annual
volume for each processor (measured in millions of tons) is signi¯cant in
the equations for solids, comminution, and LU. Holding all else equal,
large volume processors receive tomatoes that are on average higher
in soluble solids, but also higher in comminution, and with a greater
proportion of limited use tomatoes.
Given the structure of processing tomato contracts described in (1),
an increase in the base price increases marginal incentives for reducing
damage, but has no e®ect on marginal incentives for quality attributes
which receive premia (or, if increases in quantity can be obtained by
the expense of these quality measures, increases in base price may
well have a negative e®ect). The negative and signi¯cant base-price
coe±cients in the solids and LU equations are both consistent with this
observation. When base price rises, the payo® from reducing LU rises
relative to the payo® from increasing solids, and growers apparently
respond accordingly. However, the negative and signi¯cant coe±cient
on comminution seems to run counter to this intuition.
The ¯rst thing to note about the coe±cients on these indicators is
that they are highly signi¯cant: incentives do matter. Even after con-
trolling for a quite comprehensive set of factors that might conceivably
a®ect realized quality outcomes (other than contract incentives), the
contract type indicators still add substantial explanatory power.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the results in Table 5 is the
degree to which complementarities across the various incentives terms
are important. For example, a contract that o®ers only solids premium
does nothing signi¯cant in terms of expected solids outcomes. However,
combining MOT or LU incentives with the solids incentives, or com-
bining all three types of incentives, results in strong positive e®ects on
expected solids outcomes. Also, note that many of the contract types
that exclude any form of solids incentives, with the notable exception
of the LU contract, lead to relatively low expected solids.
Incentives for comminution are never o®ered in isolation, and result
in higher expected quality (lower comminution) when they're combined

































Solids Worms Comm. Green Mold MOT LU
Volume 0.0000¤ -0.0000 0.0002¤ 0.0001¤ 0.0000 0.0000¤ 0.0001¤
( 8.7522) ( -1.4195) ( 17.0295) ( 18.1017) ( 1.4401) ( 3.7732) ( 9.0434)
Base Price -0.0002¤ 0.0000¤ -0.0008¤ -0.0002¤ 0.0001¤ 0.0001¤ 0.0000
(-13.0262) ( 5.7822) ( -8.4229) ( -6.6539) ( 2.6094) ( 3.1745) ( 0.1345)
Solids 0.0001 -0.0006¤ -0.0803¤ -0.0180¤ -0.0036 -0.0101¤ -0.0544¤
( 0.0554) ( -2.3426) (-14.0904) ( -8.6488) ( -1.0268) ( -9.0395) (-10.8786)
MOT -0.0150¤ -0.0022¤ -0.0249¤ -0.0279¤ 0.0014 -0.0052¤ -0.0735¤
(-10.4997) ( -6.3457) ( -3.4119) (-10.4767) ( 0.3084) ( -3.6248) (-11.4725)
MOT, Solids 0.0432¤ 0.0000 0.0183¤ -0.0193¤ -0.0545¤ -0.0157¤ -0.1780¤
( 25.8493) ( 0.0747) ( 2.1337) ( -6.1673) (-10.2397) ( -9.3376) (-23.7139)
LU 0.0275¤ -0.0030¤ 0.0144 -0.0529¤ -0.0716¤ -0.0157¤ 0.0121
( 10.0541) ( -4.5200) ( 1.0296) (-10.3482) ( -8.2122) ( -5.7175) ( 0.9824)
LU, Solids 0.0465¤ -0.0003 -0.2497¤ -0.0248¤ -0.0189¤ -0.0255¤ -0.0808¤
( 18.0089) ( -0.5377) (-18.8977) ( -5.1364) ( -2.3021) ( -9.8143) ( -6.9711)
LU, MOT 0.0071¤ -0.0014¤ -0.1109¤ -0.0110¤ 0.0146¤ 0.0001 -0.0134¤
( 6.6771) ( -5.5486) (-20.3337) ( -5.5018) ( 4.2982) ( 0.0718) ( -2.7992)
LU, MOT, Solids 0.0303¤ -0.0019¤ 0.1760¤ -0.0404¤ -0.0345¤ -0.0200¤ 0.0203
( 12.7454) ( -3.3707) ( 14.4889) ( -9.1018) ( -4.5606) ( -8.3786) ( 1.9069)
LU, Mold, MOT, Solids 0.0146¤ -0.0000 0.1260¤ 0.0032 -0.0806¤ -0.0161¤ -0.0861¤
( 5.2743) ( -0.0258) ( 8.8956) ( 0.6236) ( -9.1477) ( -5.7846) ( -6.9336)
Comm, Solids 0.0150¤ 0.0028¤ -0.0444¤ -0.0121¤ 0.0543¤ 0.0016 -0.2253¤
( 5.5289) ( 4.3230) ( -3.1953) ( -2.3899) ( 6.2810) ( 0.5691) (-18.4800)
Comm, LU 0.0034¤ -0.0015¤ 0.1204¤ -0.0339¤ -0.0380¤ -0.0156¤ -0.0333¤
( 2.3475) ( -4.4497) ( 16.4068) (-12.6536) ( -8.3240) (-10.8092) ( -5.1678)
Comm, LU, Solids 0.0094¤ -0.0034¤ -0.0814¤ -0.0392¤ -0.0387¤ -0.0126¤ 0.0214¤
( 7.4408) (-11.3665) (-12.6144) (-16.6488) ( -9.6456) ( -9.9643) ( 3.7859)
Comm, LU, MOT -0.0175¤ -0.0011¤ -0.1248¤ -0.0228¤ -0.0110 -0.0003 -0.1190¤
( -9.4202) ( -2.5125) (-13.1460) ( -6.5806) ( -1.8684) ( -0.1576) (-14.2900)
Comm, LU, MOT, Solids -0.0028 -0.0027¤ -0.1357¤ -0.0314¤ -0.0682¤ -0.0039 -0.0595¤
( -1.0834) ( -4.4240) (-10.3835) ( -6.5718) ( -8.3914) ( -1.5097) ( -5.1932)
Comm, Green, LU, MOT -0.0682¤ 0.0035 -0.0225 0.0856¤ 0.2209¤ -0.0172 -0.0571
( -5.6761) ( 1.2254) ( -0.3665) ( 3.8124) ( 5.7728) ( -1.4212) ( -1.0579)
R2 0.3706 0.0619 0.4020 0.2867 0.3302 0.1319 0.3191
Relative E±ciency 0.1493 0.0373 0.1659 0.0517 0.0691 0.1433 0.1055
Table 5. Regression Results for Quality Measures. Each column corresponds to a particular regres-
sion; ¯gures in parentheses are t-statistics. Each regression also includes the collection of dummy
variables described in the ¯rst three rows of Table 4 and a constant, and are estimated subject to
the restriction that each set of dummy variables must sum to zero. The penultimate row gives R2
statistics for each regression equation, while the ¯nal row gives the ratio of the marginal increase in
R2 due to the variables reported in the table divided by the marginal increase in R2 which results
from instead adding a set of processor-year dummies.EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 21
combined with incentives for LU, MOT, and solids. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, expected quality falls when comminution and LU incentives are
bundled. Even though the sign of this e®ect seems somewhat coun-
terintuitive, it is still consistent with the notion that the incentives
o®ered by processors have their intended e®ect. For example, imagine
that some processor places a particularly high value on low levels of LU,
relative to other measures of quality. How might we expect this proces-
sor to design its incentive schedule? Looking at Table 5, it's apparent
that o®ering just LU incentives won't achieve much. The processor can
achieve low expected LU by o®ering incentives for a variety of quality
measures other than LU (e.g., MOT, solids and MOT, Comm. and
solids), but these incentives induce high expected levels for measures
about which the processor cares very little. Alternatively, the processor
can choose between o®ering incentives for LU and Comm., LU, solids,
and Comm., or LU, MOT, and Comm.. Each of these combinations
has the intended e®ect of reducing expected LU, and depending on the
processor's valuation of solids, MOT, and Comm. outcomes, any of
these combinations may be adequate. If in addition to LU, the proces-
sor values low levels of MOT, but cares little about solids and Comm.,
the contract type that combines LU and Comm. incentives will be
preferred, and this results in relatively high levels of expected Comm.
(though the intended e®ect is to reduce expected LU).
Each of the signi¯cant coe±cients in the MOT equation for contract
types that contain some form of MOT premium are negative. The same
is true in the LU equation (for coe±cients with some form of LU pre-
mium), with the exception of the contract type that o®ers incentives for
Comm., LU, MOT, and solids. Interestingly, this particular contract
also happens to have a large e®ect on expected Comm. outcomes so
that a similar interpretation to the one provided above for the LU and
Comm. contract can be provided for this seemingly counterintuitive
result.
In Table 5, the base price coe±cient has the expected sign in each
equation, and is signi¯cant in the equations for green and mold. A
high base price provides relatively high-powered incentives for reducing
damage, and growers are able to respond e®ectively for the green and
mold measures.
The results in Table 5, while revealing, involve the use of only very
crude measures of variation in contracts. We'd like a simple way to
characterize contracts which would capture not only the presence of a
given sort of incentive, but which would also capture variation in the
magnitude of such incentives. In this we are guided by the problemEFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 22
facing the growers who care principally about the expected compensa-
tion received under any given contract. We summarize the expected
\power" of incentives in two ways. First, for each quality attribute, we
compute the di®erence between expected compensation, and expected
compensation after removing incentives for the relevant attribute. This
measure of power is a sort of average price o®ered for the attribute. Sec-
ond, we compute the di®erence between expected compensation when
quality is increased marginally (¯ve percentile points above the per-
centile for the mean of each measure), and actual expected compensa-
tion. This measure of power gives in indication of the marginal increase
in payment the grower can expect from taking actions to marginally
improve quality.
Of course, in computing these measure for grower i and processor `, it
won't do to use loads delivered by i, as these quantities are endogenous,
depending on the actions taken by the grower in response to incentives.
Instead, for each grower i and processor `, we compute average incen-
tives using the loads delivered by other growers. Because contractual
provisions for any given processor vary across years and often depend
on variety, location, and the timing of delivery, we also condition these
quantities on tomato variety v, county d, delivery month m, and year
t.
7. Conclusion
We use data from California's processing tomato industry to in-
vestigate the in°uence of contract incentives on realized production
outcomes. Our data are generated from the activities of roughly 51
processors who collectively contracted with approximately 250 tomato
growers in each year during the period 1993-99. Though contracts for
processing tomatoes in California all have a similar generic structure,
details vary considerably across processors and years. In this paper,
we examine the extent to which this variation can explain di®erences
in production outcomes across processors.
Even after controlling for an exhaustive set of factors that might con-
ceivably e®ect expected production outcomes (grower-year, location-
month-year, and variety-year e®ects), contract incentives do indeed
matter. Because each processor o®ers a single contract in a given year,
processor-year e®ects provide an upper bound for the amount of vari-
ation in production outcomes that might be explained by di®erences
in contract terms across processors. Relative to this upper bound, the
much more parsimonious set of variables we include to re°ect premia
o®ered in these contracts perform surprisingly well. This suggests thatEFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 23
much of the variation in contract incentives across processors is cap-
tured in the explicit contracts we observe, though one can imagine
many sorts of indirect or implicit incentives that might also be impor-
tant.
The speci¯c e®ects observed for di®erent contract types are generally
consistent with what one would expect: when the premium awarded
on a particular quality measure goes up, this leads to higher expected
outcomes in the same measure. Also, with only one exception, variation
in base price has the anticipated consequence that growers shift their
attention to quality measures that show up as \deducts" in processors'
incentive schedules. This in turn leads to lower levels for measures that
only receive \premia".
A somewhat surprising aspect of our results is the degree to which
complementarities across di®erent types of incentive instruments are
important. Almost without exception, the combined e®ect of multiple
incentive premiums generally has a larger and more signi¯cant e®ect on
expected quality outcomes than any single premium. Alternatively, of-
fering incentives on just one or a few types of quality measures can have
a variety of (possibly) unintended consequences. The fact that some
contracts were o®ered during a short period and then subsequently
discontinued suggests that processors experiment with alternative con-
tract designs, and that contract design is a delicate task.
For the purpose of this paper, we have intentionally been agnostic
regarding the e±ciency of the contracts we observe. Our only aim has
been to characterize the empirical relevance of variation in contract
provisions across processors and years. A natural next step in this line
of research is to examine how well the contracts we observe match up
with theory. For example, the additive separability of various qual-
ity measures observed in tomato processing contracts imply something
quite speci¯c about the structure of the production technology gov-
erning production outcomes. In particular, additive separability of the
compensation growers receive in the form of quality premia requires
some form of conditional independence across measures, and one could
conceivably test for such independence. A more ambitious exercise
would be to compare estimates of an e±cient contract with those actu-
ally observed (see Haubrich and Popova (1998) and Hueth and Ligon
(2002) for progress in this direction).EFFICACY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 24
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